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Abstract 
 
 
An attempt has been made in this paper to study the linkage between 
decentralisation and poverty reduction with special reference to panchayati raj 
institutions in Tamil Nadu. The policy implication of the study emphasises that the 
process of decentralisation should be designed and implemented so as to achieve 
required reduction in poverty.  
In the globalised era, decentralization has attracted significant interest in 
recent years. Decentralization is being seen as one of the missing institutional link 
between economic growth and distributive justice. Decentralisation is linked to 
poverty reduction in many ways. While decentralization has become a development 
strategy of many developing countries, its linkage to poverty reduction in particular 
has been the subject of recent time. In India, where social and rural sector are still 
backward and further affected by the ongoing liberalisation, privatisation and 
globalisation process, even high growth rates and innumerable poverty eradication 
schemes of the union as well as the state governments have failed to ensure 
distributive justice and left millions in sustained deprivation. Panchayati raj 
institutions could be a promising institutional link to combat poverty in terms of 
efficient designing and effective targeting.  
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Poverty Reduction by Decentralisation  
A Case for Rural Panchayats in Tamil Nadu    
  
K. Jothi Sivagnanam 
I Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to study the relationship between decentralisation and 
poverty with reference to Tamil Nadu, a middle income state in India.  
When the role of the State is being challenged by the neo-liberals in the 
globalised era, decentralization has attracted significant interest in recent years. 
Decentralisation towards ‘local self governance’ has acquired new attention first as a 
development strategy and then as an institutional necessity to combat poverty.  
Decentralisation refers to downward transfer of functions, funds, functionaries 
and independent decision making powers to democratically elected local governments 
that are accountable and accessible to their citizens. The modern theoretical rationale 
for decentralization argues that public goods can be provided at local level in an 
efficient manner along with benefit–cost linkages. While the economist‘s rationale is 
instrumental, there are also ideological or political arguments for decentralization, 
which rest on democracy, participation, empowerment and governance. Poverty 
reduction means designing, implementing and targeting appropriate methods to ensure 
that scarce resources are allocated in such a way to get maximum impact on the poor 
and decrease their level of deprivation and vulnerability (Sen, 1999; World Bank, 
2001).  
Decentralisation is linked to poverty reduction in many ways. While 
decentralization has become a development strategy of many developing countries, its 
linkage to poverty reduction in particular has been the subject of recent time. In India, 
where social and rural sector are still backward and further affected by the ongoing 
liberalisations, privatisation and globalisation process, even high growth rates and 
innumerable poverty eradication schemes of the union as well as the state 
governments have failed to ensure distributive justice and left millions in sustained 
deprivation. Panchayati raj institutions could be a promising institutional link to 
combat poverty in terms of efficient designing and effective targeting.  
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The paper aims to examine the relationship of decentralisation to poverty 
reduction with reference to Tamil Nadu in the light of the theoretical works. The 
resultant policy implication emphasises that the process of decentralisation should be 
designed and implemented so as to achieve required reduction in poverty.  
The paper has been structured as follows. Section II briefly describes the 
significance of local government in terms of economic and political theories and then 
in terms of its linkages to poverty reduction. Then ever elusive growth-poverty 
linkage in India and the emerging emphasis for a ‘inclusive growth’ strategies are 
discussed in  Section III followed by a brief review of the practice of local 
government in Tamil Nadu in Section IV. Section V argues the case for the critical 
role of rural panchayats in poverty reduction in Tamil Nadu in light of the present 
practice. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusion.  
II Theories of Decentralisation 
 The economic efficiency and welfare gains from decentralisation are normally 
considered with reference to the deadweight losses that result from centralisation 
(Oates, 1972). Public goods can be provided to meet the diversified needs of the people 
across all sub-central units in a cost-efficient manner through proper decentralization 
(Tiebout,1961; Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1983). Then decentralisation can act as a 
surrogate for market discipline and ensure efficiency in the production of public goods 
(Tiebout,1956). Thus, decentralisation is an optimal form of public sector organisation 
combining a centralised and decentralised decision process so as to be able to provide 
public goods in accordance with the diversified preferences of the residents in different 
regions while at the same time reaping the gains of economies of scale.  
Different public goods have different spatial characteristics and the areas of 
benefits of many activities are much smaller than the entire country. Most public goods 
directly affect only the persons in local or regional level and the gains from 
decentralisation therefore are much greater, the greater the diversity in preference 
levels among persons in various areas. Thus the governmental activities can’t be 
adjusted separately for each person on the basis of that person’s preference schedule 
but each local unit can adjust the level of its activity to meet the preferences of its 
residents. Otherwise, persons may tend to migrate in those local units that provide the 
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mixture of activities and taxes they prefer (Tiebout Effect). Hence the decentralisation 
theorem suggests that services which are nationwide in their benefit incidence (like 
defence) should be provided nationally, services with local benefits (like street lights) 
should be provided by local units and still others (such as highways) should be 
provided for on a regional basis (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). From this 
perspective poverty reduction ought to be the function of the lowest tier. 
 At local level, more effective collective decision-making and greater popular 
control can be exercised over the precise manner in which the services are provided. 
Hence, the local authorities can play a vital role in poverty eradication.  
 Among these roles, the principle of benefit region holds more significance 
because the benefit incidence of various social goods is subject to spatial limitation and 
therefore, each service should be decided upon and paid for within the confines of the 
jurisdiction in which the benefit accrues. This linkage between the decision to spend 
and that to raise resources would help to fiscal discipline and accountability among the 
sub-central units.  
There are three governmental functions visualised by Musgrave (1959) viz. 
allocation, stabilization and redistribution. Traditionally, the general consensus seems 
to be that sub central authorities may have a significant role to play in the allocation 
function, that they will have little or no part to play in the distribution function and 
that they will have no part at all to play in the stabilization function (Musgrave, 1965; 
Oates, 1972, 1977; King, 1984). However, the experience and the consequent modern 
literature have brought considerable change in the reasoning and argued that the sub 
central tiers have significant role in redistribution.   It is shown that local governments 
are expected to and actually can play an important role in designing and implementing 
poverty alleviation strategies (Ladd and Doolittle, 1982; Brown and Oates, 1987).   
Decentralisation, Democracy and  Empowerment  
While the economists' rationale is instrumental, there are also political 
arguments for decentralisation, which rest on democracy, participation, empowerment 
and governance. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that good governments are those 
which are closer to the people. Since J.S.Mill, this justification has been closely related 
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to issues of people's participation and democracy (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998). 
Thus decentralisation supports democratisation by allowing people or elected 
representatives to command more power in public policy decision-making. Such 
decentralised democratic decision-making ensures welfare of all those who are likely 
to be affected by such decisions. This basic rationale is derived from the participative 
democratic imperative that all people whose well-being are affected by decisions ought 
to participate in such decision making process. When everybody participates, self-
interest will guide him or her to arrive at decisions that are consistent with collective 
well being.  Crook and Manor (1998) summarise the case: ' decentralisation combined 
with democratisation (usually in its electoral representative form) might provide 
greater transparency, accountability, responsiveness, probity, frugality, efficiency, 
equity and opportunities for mass participation'. 
Decentralisation also opens a wider political space for weaker and vulnerable 
sections to act upon and paves way for their empowerment. Empowerment emanates 
from participation. Democratic decentralisation, by making participation easier, makes 
empowerment more feasible at the local level than it would be at the national level, 
especially for minorities and vulnerable groups (Blair, 1997). In India, most of such 
communities are weaker economically, socially and politically but not numerically. 
Decentralisation provides them newer and wider political space to act upon 
collectively towards their well-being.  
Decentralisation – Poverty Linkages 
According to the literature (Bird, et. al., 1995; Bird and Villancourt, 1998), 
there are many specific ways through which decentralisation enters into the strategies 
of poverty reduction. First, effective implementation of poverty reduction strategies, 
any other public services for that matter, often requires detailed and specific local 
knowledge. The local knowledge can be obtained most readily and accurately through 
a decentralised system of governance than that of a centralized one. Further, the 
proximity of policy implementers to the target groups reduce information and 
transaction costs of identifying the poor and helps in designing potentially successful 
‘capacity improving’ and ‘safety net’ policies’ (Rao, 2002).  
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Given the assumption that people should get their choice rather than the choice 
of someone else sitting in a far off place, public expenditure programmes including 
that of poverty reduction, can be designed in tune with the local variations in 
preferences. By doing so, decentralised provision of public goods can enhance 
efficiency and achieve welfare gains (Oates, 1999). From this perspective,   
decentralisation is good in principle and this virtue depends upon political 
accountability and the inevitable need to strengthen local delivery capacity (Ayee, 
1996; Bird and Rodriquez, 1999; Crook, 2003).     
Delegating decision making-powers and adequate resources to the locally 
elected representatives may also lead to better and efficient targeting of the really 
deserving poor, and ensure accountability. Democracy is one basic institutional 
system that ensures accountability of the elected representatives to the public. Above 
all, according to the literature, accountability is ensured by ‘matching principle’ 
It means linking the decision to spend with responsibility to raise resources 
and it is expected to bring accountability and efficiency in resource allocation. Ideally 
to the extent possible, benefit areas should be matched with financing areas, 
expenditure responsibilities should be matched with revenue resources and revenue 
capacities should be matched with political accountability (Bird, 2002). The local 
governance system could also help avoid wastages particularly when the decisions to 
spend and tax are closely related. Finally, decentralisation can help reduce poverty by 
efficient targeting of poverty combating public investment.  
III  Ever Elusive Growth-Poverty Link in India 
The Union and State governments have pumped several billions of rupees in 
the name of poverty eradication schemes and failed to lift everyone even after sixty 
years of efforts, strategies and schemes. The failure of the developmental state in 
reducing poverty was seen in terms of its insensitivity, casualness, lack of 
accountability and inertia of the delivery process. Thus, centralized planning, both at 
New Delhi and Chennai and the mind-boggling proliferation of poverty eradication 
schemes had not solved the basic problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
The neo-liberal policy prescriptions in general and fiscal consolidation in particular 
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have squeezed public expenditure on many crucial sectors and the poverty levels 
continued.  
The ‘trickle down’ theory failed miserably and nothing has ‘trickled down’ 
even at 8-9 percent growth rates witnessed in recent years. More than 300 millions of 
Indian people are continued to remain in deprivation (NSS, 61st Round) inspite of the 
fact that the country has been elevated to higher growth trajectories. Sen’s capability 
approach and UNDP’s sustained effort have also succeeded in de-emphasising the 
growth centered approach and succeeded in promoting ‘human development’ as the 
cardinal development objective. 
These trends have forced the policy makers in the developing countries to 
reconsider their growth centered approach. It also helped to renew our focus on 
poverty reduction with new strategies. Decentralization is being seen as one of the 
missing institutional link between growth and distributive justice. Decentralization 
and poverty reduction are the two policy focuses that significantly influenced the 
developmental discourse of many developing countries in recent times.  
At the international level, the central focus of World Development Report 
2006 is the ‘pursuit of equality of opportunity while avoiding extreme deprivation’. 
The Planning Commission of India in its Approach Paper to Eleventh Plan declared, 
though without specific strategy, ‘inclusive growth’ as its plan objective. The State 
Planning Commission of Tamil Nadu has come out with a “technically sound 
approach … to place importance on the  “growth process” alongside the growth rate’ 
(K. Jothi Sivagnanam, 2006).  
Thus, poverty reduction became the ‘inevitable’ objective of many developing 
countries and international agencies. Though many of them have announced ‘prop-
poor’ /‘inclusive growth’ policies, their effectiveness is doubtful in the absence of 
concrete strategies. Against this backdrop, the linkage between decentralisation and 
poverty reduction in Tamil Nadu is examined.  
IV  New Local Governments in Tamil Nadu 
 In India, Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) are the institutional expression of 
the local governments. In Independent India, rural development acquired marked 
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focus and became the part of the overall development strategy. Thus rural 
development, as a strategy, includes improvement in the quality of life of rural masses 
through better infrastructure in terms of health, education, drinking water, roads, 
housing, sanitation, electricity, etc. That is, local rural communities were both the 
basis and object of rural development; and participation became an appropriate 
development strategy and panchayats the necessary institutional agencies. PRIs are 
seen mainly as a means to rural development. That is justifiable even today because 
742 million (72.2 per cent) Indian people (Census 2001) still dwells in rural areas.  
The 73rd Constitutional Amendments marked the beginning of the new third tier of 
government with constitutional status.  
The Tamil Nadu Conformity Act 1994’ has a three-tier system on the rural 
side with a village panchayat at the grass root level. It introduced direct election, State 
Finance Commission, State Election Commission and reservation for SC, ST and 
women.  
Functions 
The Constitutional Act listed 29 subjects such as agriculture, small scale 
industries, rural housing, drinking water, poverty alleviation, education, health and 
social welfare. The state Act assigned similar subjects for panchayats, but has avoided 
any reference to 'self government'. The crucial challenge is the inter se distribution of 
29 functions among the various tiers of panchayats and a meaningful coordination 
there of.  
The Jain Commission (1997) appointed by the state government had proposed 
inter-tier allocation of the 29 subjects. However, the opposition and panchayat 
representatives, have demanded powers, functions and finances as per 73rd Act. The 
government constituted a High Level Committee which submitted 1209 
recommendations but the government accepted only 718 of them. In the final tally, 
the works actually assigned to the village panchayats are mostly civic amenities and 
not developmental in nature. 
There are 12 618 village panchayats in the state and per district average is 435. 
The Village Panchayat President is given very meagre funds and staff. Most of such 
functions were assigned only by Government Orders. This leaves a great deal of 
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discretionary powers to the state and district administration rather than to the elected 
president.  
Funds 
 Assignment of adequate resources to the lower tiers in Tamil Nadu is a vexing 
issue since 1996. It is evident from the theory as well as the experience of neighbors 
(Kerala and Karnataka) that panchayats, if assigned powers and funds, can perform 
really well on poverty reduction, primary education, health, civic amenities and rural 
development as whole. For such an effective and meaningful functioning of panchayat 
raj institutions, it is necessary to devolve required resources to perform the functions 
assigned. The fiscal support from higher tiers deserves added significance in lieu of 
the fact that rural local government have not been assigned any elastic own revenue 
source. Though the TNP Act assigned taxes, fees and duties and grants for village 
panchayats, their total revenue potential is very meagre that most of them are unable 
to pay even the electricity bill and staff salary. 
The First State Finance Commission (SFC) has recommended 8 per cent of  
state tax revenue for the first year and 1 per cent increase for every subsequent year. 
However the state government has accepted only 8 per cent for all the years. The 
Second SFC has retained the 8 per cent. 
The SFC grant is Rs. 1224.76 crores in 2006-07. Rs 710 crore (58 percent) is 
devolved for the two rural tiers and per district share comes to Rs. 24.5 cores. If this 
amount is shared among 435 village panchayats and 32 blocks per district by any 
reckoning, one can imagine what will be left to one village panchayats. The Union 
Finance Commission grant for the year 2006-07 is a just Rs. 174 crores.    
Total transfers including assigned and own revenue of the local government is 
not even two percent of the NSDP in the state. The SFC transfer alone in terms of the 
revenue receipts of the state is just around five percent. While the SFC’s grant is 
below 0.7 per cent of NSDP, the union finance commission's transfers is pathetically 
very low at 0.1 per cent of NSDP. The own and assigned revenue of the local 
government is at around 0.3 per cent is also a cause of serious concern. Thus, the size 
of the local governments is insignificant and support of the state and the union is 
inadequate.  
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V  Poverty Reduction Schemes 
However, there are innumerable state and centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) 
for poverty reduction and rural development for which the state continue to engage 
only the district administration rather the democratically elected local government 
institutions. For instance, the revised budget estimate is Rs. 3, 279. crores for rural 
development and panchayati raj institutions during 2006-07. Out of which Rs 3, 215 
crores have been provided for state and centrally sponsored schemes including that of 
part two schemes.  While the Union and State governments have designed theses 
schemes and issued guidelines, the District Collector (as Chairman DRDA and 
Inspector of Panchayats for all the tiers), the Project Officer DRDA, BDO (as the 
executive authority for the village and block level panchayats) administer almost all 
those schemes.   
The 'local self-governments' are expected to design and execute their own 
schemes of ‘economic development and social justice'. But in Tamil Nadu, as in many 
other states too, they have no schemes of their own but only witnessing schemes 
imposed from higher tiers and executed under the total control of district 
administration. It is evident from the theoretical discussion that local governments are 
the missing institutional link to reduce poverty.   
One of the reasons for such lack of state government support to panchayats is 
the charge about the level of local corruption. Rao (2002) argued that it is an empirical 
issue and a priori. It is not possible to conclude that local government officials and 
politicians are more corrupt than those of the central government. Thimmaiah (2002) 
also argued that corruption is such a universal phenomenon that can be used against all 
tiers and forms of government. At the local level, transparency is forced on the 
functioning of the locally elected representatives and bureaucrats. It is easy for the 
local people to identify and expose corruption.   
VI  Concluding Remarks 
Nothing wrong in being an optimist, but expecting, as our Constitution does, 
'to ensure economic development and social justice' and 'self-government' is over 
ambitious at this stage. What one can look for, reasonably now is completing the 
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institutionalization fully. Then, at least some basic minimum services like water, 
primary education, primary health care and above all poverty reduction have to be 
ensured through local government. For which, the local government should breath. 
Commitments of the state government and assured regular flow of funds are the 
necessary and essential conditions for that. The state Act needs to be redesigned to 
implement all the poverty eradication schemes. The district administration can extend 
technical and capacity building supports. Village assembly needs to be strengthened 
to ensure accountability.    
Considering the present pathetic fiscal health of the state governments, it is the 
responsibility of the Union to take required initiative. As local governments became a 
constitutional mandate, the Union government should come forward to make regular 
transfers, of course not directly to the local government but via the state governments. 
Further, all the centrally sponsored poverty alleviation, rural employment schemes 
should be transferred to the local governments.  
 
 
[ I thank Dr. V. Loganathan, Emeritus Professor of Economics, 278 11th Street, 
TNHB Colony, Koratoor 600 080 for his comments and suggestions. ]  
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